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Putting Causality Into Structural Equation Modeling 
 
 
 “Most quantitative empirical analyses are motivated by the desire to estimate the causal 
effect of an independent variable on a dependent variable. Although the randomized 
experiment is the most powerful design for this task, in most social science research done 
outside of psychology, experimental designs are infeasible” (Winship & Morgan, 1999, p. 
659). 
 
The above quote from earlier work by Winship and Morgan, which was instrumental in 
setting the groundwork for their book, captures the essence of our review of Morgan and 
Winship’s (2007) book: It is about causality in non-experimental settings. In a similar vein, our 
review “began” a few years ago, too. The first author of this review (John) was one of the 
members of the professorial selection committee of the second author (Rafael); John found 
Rafael’s job talk intriguing. Rafael used a methodological approach that apparently produced 
causal estimates in the context of a non-experimental setting. Coming from a background in 
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psychology, John was puzzled and surprised by Rafael’s results and the confidence with which 
Rafael made causal claims. Rafael, an economist, argued that the non-experimental method he 
used mimicked an experiment even though Rafael had not randomly assigned anyone to 
treatment or control conditions.  
How could Rafael defy the logic of random assignment yet claim to produce causal 
estimates? John, shaking his head in disbelief, chanted what was at that time his mantra: 
“correlation is not causation, correlation is not causation….” Yet, after Rafael’s patient 
explanations during the job talk and after John took the time to understand the method Rafael 
used, John quickly changed his tune as he became convinced that Rafael was right. The topic of 
causality has since been a major discussion between John and Rafael.  
What helped John better understand causality in nonexperimental settings was the 
counterfactual account of causality (Morgan & Winship, 2007; Winship & Morgan, 1999). Since 
our first discussions, we have both bought this book and Rafael has actually assigned it as 
compulsory reading in an advanced econometrics course (so we already voted on this book with 
our Swiss Francs!). Although John still uses experiments (e.g., Antonakis & Dalgas, 2009), part 
of his current work is far from experimental and yet it is at the doorstep of causality. He, too, now 
includes healthy doses of counterfactual-type thinking in the structural equation modeling course 
he teaches.  
 For those interested to know, Rafael used a regression discontinuity design (see Lalive, 
2008); he went to publish this work in a special issue on regression discontinuity in a top 
economics journal (see Cook, 2008). Describing the workings of this estimator is beyond the 
scope of the review (and be it known that this estimator has impressed John so much that two of 
his graduate students are writing papers using a regression discontinuity design!). However, what 
is really important to understand before discussing the Morgan and Winship book is a persistent 
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problem that most structural equation modelers doing nonexperimental research face: This 
problem is that of Endogeneity.  
 Many modelers have never heard of this term; those who have, particularly if they work 
outside economics, do not understand the consequences of endogeneity’s insipient effects.  They 
know of endogenous variables and simply assume them to be modeled as consequences of other, 
exogenous variables. However, if these other exogenous variables are not truly exogenous (i.e., 
vary randomly, independent of other causes) the modeler will estimate a model that cannot be 
interpreted.  
 The importance of this book will quickly become evident once readers understand the 
problem of endogeneity and the counterfactual account of causality. We thus take the time to first 
provide a summary overview of Morgan and Winship’s counterfactual framework. Thereafter, we 
provide a summary of the book’s chapters and evaluate it. As will be evident in our review, we 
believe that the Morgan and Winship book is an important and useful book that social science 
researchers and particularly structural-equation modelers who undertake nonexperimental 
research, should read. This book should appeal to such researchers, whether they are seasoned or 
aspiring professionals.  
 
Summary of the book: Background to the counterfactual 
A nice way of motivating the contribution of this book is via the following quotation:  
“In the counterfactual modelling tradition, attention is focused on estimating various 
average causal effects, by analysis of the values  , for groups of individuals defined by 
specific characteristics. To do so effectively, the process by which individuals of different 
types are exposed to the cause of interest must be modelled [italics ours]. Doing so 
involves introducing defendable assumptions that allow for the estimation of the average 
unobservable counterfactual values for specific groups of individuals. If the assumptions 
are defendable, and a suitable method for constructing an average contrast from the data is 
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chose, then an average difference in the values of can be given a causal interpretation” 
(Morgan and Winship, 2007, p. 6).  
 
 The above quotation is key to understanding the problems of selection and endogeneity. 
We briefly explain what is meant by these terms while we summarize key ideas and examples 
from the book, focusing particularly on the Morgan and Winship “counterfactual” framework. In 
fact, thinking in terms of counterfactuals is, for us, essential to understanding causality; we thus 
take the time to thoroughly explain the counterfactual account of causality to readers.  
In a structural equation or regression model, variables can be endogenous or exogenous. 
Endogenous variables are determined by other variables (or the error term) in the system of 
equations. There are also exogenous variables, that is, variables that vary independently of other 
causes in the model. We will discuss the simple cases of simultaneous equation models with 
observed variables. However, what we discuss, and the recommendations made in this book, are 
equally relevant for structural equation models with latent variables as well.  
Knowing whether a variable is exogenous or endogenous, and then modeling the system 
of equations correctly, is the most important factor for determining whether or not model 
estimates will make any sense. By “sense” we mean that the estimates are consistent, that is, that 
they reflect the true (causal) relation between a supposed cause, x, and an effect, y. A consistent 
estimate converges to the true estimate with an increasing sample size. However, an inconsistent 
estimate does not have this desirable property. Morgan and Winship are rightly concerned with 
consistency of estimation and they hammer at this point again and again in the book. Efficiency 
(i.e., having smaller estimations of the variance) is, of course, important too; however, as Morgan 
and Winship mention, there is no point is producing efficient estimates when they are biased. 
Unfortunately, many applied researchers in social sciences are unaware of the problem of 
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consistency.  It is our hope that this book, and our review, which strongly endorses this book, will 
help to correct this sad state of affairs.  
To understand the problem of consistency we discuss omitted variable bias, a topic first 
introduced in the book in Chapter 1 (see page 11) and then discussed in more detail in Chapter 5. 
Assume the following basic and correct specification:  
 =  +  + 	                                                           (1) 
As the book suggests, an estimator, whether maximum likelihood (ML) or ordinary least 
squares (OLS) assumes that x is orthogonal to the error term e. The error term includes all 
sources of variance in y that are not accounted for by x. Orthogonality with the error term is 
guaranteed in experimental research: There is no variable that could be modeled that would 
correlate with the treatment, x, and also correlate with y. In the case of nonexperimental research, 
the problem the modeler faces is the possibility of omitted variables, which would make x 
correlate with the e term. What does this correlation mean, precisely, and what are its 
consequences? This book seeks to answer this question and also to provide solutions to this 
problem.  
In the context of an experiment with two groups (as captured by the dummy variable x 
above), the individuals who have been assigned to the treatment group (coded 1) and control 
group (coded 0) have been assigned using a random process. A key condition of the OLS or ML 
estimator, the orthogonality of x with the error term, is thus satisfied. Because of this assignment 
process, the individuals constituting the two groups are, on average, approximately equal on all 
observed or unobserved characteristics. Random assignment ensures this outcome because each 
individual has the same probability (.50) of being assigned to the treatment or control group. If 
the sample is sufficiently large, and given the variation in characteristics of samples of 
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individuals, we should observe, on average, that the two groups are interchangeable (within 
sampling error). Now here comes the key idea of the book: The counterfactual. Because the 
sample of individuals in each group are approximately equal at pretreatment, we can observe the 
counterfactual: That is, we can observe what the treatment group, on the average, would have 
received on y had it not been treated, and we can equally observe, on the average, what the 
control group would have had on y had it been treated.  Of course, as Morgan and Winship 
mention, the counterfactual is not directly observed in the sense that we do not observe what y of 
individual i would have been had she not received the treatment. The counterfactual is 
constructed at the level of analysis at which the treatment is administered, that is, the group, 
which is possible given that the groups are approximately equivalent. Thus, the causal effect is 
simply the difference in the means of y for the two groups, 
 − 
, and the reliability of this 
difference can be statistically estimated. 
Morgan and Winship note that if, however, the treatment has not been assigned randomly 
and if this nonrandom selection process is not explicitly modeled, then x will correlate with e. 
The groups are not interchangeable anymore; the counterfactual cannot be observed. For 
example, suppose that some process affected how general intelligence was distributed between 
the two groups and suppose that individuals in the treatment group are on average more 
intelligent than those in the control group. Suppose also that being more intelligent predicts y and 
that the treatment had an effect. In this situation, the slope of x cannot be correctly estimated 
because it includes the effect of the treatment and that of IQ. Thus, with IQ omitted from the 
model, the slope of x will be biased to the extent that x correlates with the omitted cause and the 
cause correlates with y. Just how bad is this bias?  
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One will not know unless one includes all omitted causes (or if one uses some other 
procedure, as detailed in the book). The book looks at different ways in which endogeneity can 
raise its ugly head. Morgan and Winship’s methodological tour de force highlights methods that 
are useful for reconstructing the counterfactual in the case where the regressors correlate with the 
error term. We summarize each of the book’s chapters next.  
Summary of book chapters 
The book begins with Part I (Ch. 1 & 2) by first introducing the counterfactual 
framework, which we have made explicit above, and provides tangible examples throughout the 
text to demonstrate why counterfactuals are necessary for causality. In all sections where Morgan 
and Winship introduce important statistical concepts in the context of the counterfactual 
framework, they are very generous in giving credit to those who made major contributions to 
providing the scaffolding for this framework, including Donald Rubin, James Heckman, Donald 
Campbell, and others. The historical overview they provide, and how they synthesize it to explain 
modern thinking on the counterfactual framework is commendable. 
In Part II, Morgan and Winship introduce causal methods designed to address simple 
problems with causal reasoning. The key assumption that makes these methods work is that the 
cause is randomly allocated to units that are the same in terms of some observed characteristic. If 
this characteristic takes on few values, the method of conditioning serves to identify causal 
effects (Ch. 3). The prime example from the literature is a randomized class size experiment that 
was conducted among 79 schools in the state of Tennessee in the early 1980s (Krueger & 
Whitmore, 2001). Under the experimental protocol each school was required to open at least one 
small class, one regular size class with teacher aide, and one regular size class serving to estimate 
the counterfactual. Schools differed with respect to the number of small size classes they opened 
depending on grade enrollment and school finances. Simply comparing students taught in small 
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classes to students taught in regular size classes across the entire experiment is therefore 
misleading. The method of conditioning asks researchers to contrast students taught in small 
classes to students taught in regular size classes at the same school. This within school contrast 
identifies the effect of reducing class size for each school. Conditioning does not work, however, 
if the set of conditioning variables contains several continuous characteristics, for instance age 
and work experience. Attempts to condition are faced with the problem of the “curse of 
dimensionality.” Chapter 4 discusses the method of matching on the propensity scores -- the 
probability of receiving treatment (along with other methods of matching). Matching on the 
propensity score addresses the curse because it compresses the full set of conditioning variables 
into a one dimensional index: The probability of receiving the treatment. Units that have the same 
probability of treatment but different exposure to treatment can be contrasted to identify the 
effect of treatment: This was the key contribution of a groundbreaking paper by Rosenbaum and 
Rubin (1983). Naturally, confounding variables can also be adjusted for by using multiple linear 
regression, the topic of Chapter 6. This chapter discusses how to specify the regression to 
measure the average causal effects of treatments.  
Part III is where most of the meat of the book is. Chapter 6 introduces the problem of 
selection, which refers to the problem we discussed when introducing endogeneity. This chapter 
gently leads on the Chapter 7, which introduces “instrumental” variables. An instrumental 
variable is an exogenous variable that correlates with the problematic predictor q as per Equation 
3 above. The instrument also correlates with y; however, the instruments only effects y via q. 
Because the instrument is exogenous, the predicted value of q has a unique property: It does not 
correlate with the error terms of the equations. Morgan and Winship explain in some detail the 
importance of instrumental-variable estimation techniques, which are the workhorse of 
econometrics. Chapter 8 is a continuation of the previous chapter, where Morgan and Winship 
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make the case that explicit theory must be used to explain how an instrumental variable generates 
the supposed causal effect. Chapter 9 deals with time-series data and regression discontinuity 
designs.  
 Part IV is the concluding chapter. Morgan and Winship provide a discussion about the 
future of the counterfactual framework. Even though they are ardent proponents of it, they take a 
very sober, honest, and for us too much of a modest perspective of their contribution to causal 
reasoning. Their honesty, however, truly makes the readers see for themselves why estimate 
consistency should be the “α” and the “ψ” of research (we leave the “ω” for efficiency, which is 
important, too).  
 
Strengths and Weaknesses of the Book 
The book is very clearly written. The authors complement equations with intuitive path 
diagrams and provide ample and tangible examples throughout. The book nicely highlights the 
importance of causality and knowing how to demonstrate it by specifying the estimated model 
correctly so that the modeled variables do not correlate with omitted causes. We really appreciate 
how Morgan and Winship drummed the fact that a simple description of a relation between two 
variables is not very useful for research or society; in fact, we believe that such research should 
simply not be published. Unfortunately, we see the opposite happening in many social science 
journals. Researchers are still not “getting it!”  
We just completed a major review paper and found that research in management and 
applied psychology is rife with endogeneity (Antonakis et al., in press). Such reviews have been 
done before having similar conclusions (Halaby, 2004; Hamilton & Nickerson, 2003). We really 
hope that those researchers and teachers who have not yet considered the problems of 
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endogeneity will take a look at the Morgan and Winship book; as an hors d’oeuvre, they might 
want to start with one of the papers we have referenced above.  
This book is a nice complement to a couple of other books that SEM researchers should 
have in their libraries. Along with Morgan and Winship, the essential basics include Angrist and 
Pischke (2008) and Shipley (2000); for those who are not fainted-hearted Pearl’s (2009) book 
might also be of interest (Morgan and Winship refer to Pearl’s work regularly). Together, these 
books go beyond books such as that by Bollen (1989), which is an outstanding book addressing 
technical aspects of estimation, but which pays scant attention to the essential basics of causality 
and the assumptions behind estimation procedures.   
Of course, all objective reviews interrupt the dithyrambic eulogies with a bit of nitpicking. 
Although we are very positive about this book, we think that the book (or at least future versions 
of it) could cover a bit more ground. For example, Morgan and Winship do not discuss 
difference-in-differences models (Angrist & Krueger, 1999), which would be natural extension to 
their discussion on time-series models. They do not give as much attention as we would have like 
to regression discontinuity designs, which are the closest thing to randomized experiments (Cook, 
Shadish, & Wong, 2008; Shadish, Cook, & Campbell, 2002). They make little mention of panel 
models and the problems of random versus fixed effects models. In fact, we were quite surprised 
that they make no mention of the venerable Hausman (1978) endogeneity test. We would also 
have appreciated a more in-depth discussion of Heckman (1979) selection models. Also, they 
also do not discuss overidentification and how the correctness of a model is tested (see Basmann, 
1960; Hansen, 1982; Sargan, 1958); this latter topic is crucial and it is interesting to note that 
unlike in other social sciences, there is no debate in econometrics about the utility of the chi-
square test of model fit.  
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Finally, in some places of the book Morgan and Winship often jump into some rather 
sophisticated statistical concepts without explaining some basics; the authors assume that readers 
have the necessary background to understand certain advanced concepts and in the process we 
think that they will lose some readers who might not have advanced statistical training. For 
instance, in the case of omitted variable bias, why, from an algebraic perspective, are coefficients 
biased? A thorough explanation of this endogeneity problem would make the book more 
accessible to a larger audience. For example, assume the following model, which is the true 
model (Antonakis et al., in press):  
                       =  +  +  + 	                                                         (2) 
Now, assume that instead of the above model, one estimates a model where z is excluded:   
                =  +  +                 (3) 
Because this model omits z, q may correlate with the error term v (which will be the case 
if q and z are correlated and z is a cause of y). In this case, instead of obtaining the unbiased 
estimate  one obtains . Morgan and Winship do not take the time to explain why, 
specifically, these two estimates might be quite different. We feel it would have been useful to 
show some of the basic steps to demonstrate the problem at hand. To show how, we express z as 
a function of q and its unique cause u, and we omit the intercept for simplicity:  
  =  +                           (4) 
We then substitute (4) into (2):   
        =  +  + ( +  ) + 	 .                       (5a) 
Multiplying out gives:  
                                    =  +  + ( +   + 	)                       (5b) 
                                                                             
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As is evident, v now correlates with x. Another way of looking at the problem is to 
rearrange the equation as a function of x: 
                   =  + ( + ) +  ( + 	)                                            (5c) 
It is now clear that the effect of x on y, as estimated by the slope , was consistently 
estimated in (2); however, it is inconsistently estimated in (3) because as indicated in (5c), the 
slope will include the correlation of q with z (i.e., ). When important causes have been omitted 
from the model, one does not estimate as per (3), but something else (). This something else, 
could be higher or lower than the correct value, which of course depends on the signs of  
and . Only in the case of  = 0 or  = 0 does  reduce to 	, suggesting that omitting z the 
model does not affect the estimate of q. Such kinds of intuitive explanations could have made the 
book more accessible to readers.  
To conclude, we are very confident that this book, as well as similar lines of research 
focusing on causal issues in nonexperimental settings, will be the future of social sciences 
research. One needs to reconstruct the counterfactual before causal effects can be correctly 
identified. Researchers should constantly be thinking in terms of: “What would the treatment 
group have received on y had it not been treated?” As for the importance of counterfactuals, we 
chuckled contemplating the following question, which we would like to pose to our future 
graduate students 25 years from now, just before we retire as professors: “What would social 
sciences have been like had the counterfactual framework not been developed?”  
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